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Abstract 
The principal result of this paper is that under endogenous international capital mobility inward FDI reduces 
the incidence of child labor if stimulated by a country’s trade policy of granting protection to the sector that 
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granting greater tariff protection or higher export subsidy to a sector that employs child labor reduces its 
incidence, and may eventually eliminate it. Since a country’s aggregate real income decreases as the import 
tariff increases, it may sometimes face the dilemma of having to choose between higher real GDP or fewer child 
workers as an entailment of its foreign trade policy. These results are obtained under standard assumptions 
about technology, and maximizing behavior on the part of both producers and families, with the latter 
maximizing a Kanger-Sen non-binary preference ranking relation subject to their budget constraints. (171 
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1. Introduction  
Child labor as a persistent, mass phenomenon, particularly in the first quarter of the 21st 
Century, is a disturbing aspect of social reality.1 The immediate policy reaction to this 
phenomenon is invariably to ban it, or at least boycott imports tainted with child labor. In 
fact, in the mid-1990’s Senator Harkins introduced a bill in the United States Congress aimed 
precisely at boycotts of such imports into the US. Partly as a reaction to the Harkins bill, Basu 
and Van (1998) provided a rigorous economic theory of child labor as a persistent, mass 
phenomenon, insofar as they demonstrated the existence of child labor in a Walrasian 
general equilibrium, and argued forcefully against such boycotts. Indeed, they admonished 
(p. 415),  
[W]e have stayed away from many of the larger issues and confine our attention to a rigorous economic 
analysis because it is not clear to us how we can take on board different aspects of this important 
phenomenon – economic, sociological, psychological – all at once. There is no choice but to dissect such 
a large phenomenon into several parts and to analyze these one at a time. Moreover, we hope that our 
paper demonstrates how well-meaning spontaneous recommendations can often backfire. This is an 
area where what seems obviously the right thing to do may turn out, on deliberation, to be quite the 
opposite. As a consequence, this is also an area where individuals and groups, with their own self-
interested agenda, can garner mass support for policies which actually benefit them while superficially 
appearing to help the cause of the laboring children. Formalism and scientific inquiry can be a bulwark 
against this. 
While the position they took was entirely judicious – and the Harkins bill fortunately never 
became law – boycotts of imports embodying child labor is not the only foreign trade policy 
choice available for influencing the incidence of child labor.2 There are, in fact, several foreign 
trade and investment policy interventions that can actually reduce the incidence of child 
labor, but a theoretical investigation of this interconnection is strikingly missing from such 
discourse to date. The purpose of this paper is to remedy this shortcoming. Since the clamor 
for such boycotts resurfaces time and again, a readily available list of demonstrably effective 
policies as substitutes ought to be helpful in keeping such counter-productive kneejerk 
sentiments at bay.     
There is now a growing empirical literature on the effects of trade openness and foreign 
direct investment (FDI) on the incidence of child labor, as in extremely careful investigations 
by Neumayer and De Soysa (2005) and Edmonds and Pacvnik (2005 and 2006), among 
                                                          
1 According to the Global Estimates of Child Labor by the ILO (2017), in 2016 there were 152 million children 
between the age of 5 and 17 years who were workers, 48% as young as 5 – 11. Of these, 73 million were engaged 
in work in hazardous health conditions. Sectoral employment of child workers was 71% in agriculture, 12% in 
industry, and 17% in services. Boys accounted for 58%, and girls, 42% of child workers. 
2 Boycotting imports that use child labor does achieve the desired effect that employers in exporting countries 
fire child workers, but that invariable places these displaced children and their families in worse predicament 
by, among other things, shifting these child workers to employment in other, non-export sectors, some of which 
involve more hazardous working conditions. Additionally, if such import boycotts cause a decline in demand 
for labor in the exporting countries, the adult wage rate can fall, which, in turn, induces more families to enter 
their children into the work force. Thus the actual effect of the boycott may be quite the opposite of what was 
intended, as noted by Basu and Van. 
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others.3 While this literature documents the effects of foreign trade and investment policies 
on child labor, it lacks trade-theoretic support from general equilibrium open economy 
models of trade theory. To fill this gap, we take the most parsimonious approach 
methodologically possible, and build a generalized version of Basu and Van’s labor supply 
function – with inter-family differences in non-labor income – into a Specific Factors model, 
to investigate the implications for child labor of interventions that take the form of import 
tariffs or export subsidies, both (i) when they stimulate inward FDI in a regime of 
endogenous international capital mobility, and (ii) when the stock of capital in the country 
is fixed. We also consider the effect of an exogenous inflow of capital into the economy 
suffering from child labor.4 For completeness, we also report the effects of import tariffs and 
export subsidies on child labor in the Heckscher-Ohlin model. In fact, Basu and Van only 
opposed a ban on imports tainted with child labor, not policies in general. On the contrary, 
they argued that “[t]here are many other kinds of policy – taxes, subsidies, and other 
restrictions – the effects of which can be checked out using our model” (p. 425). This very 
line of inquiry is pursued in this paper. 
Basu and Van’s discovery of multiple Walrasian general equilibria in an economy – some 
with child labor and some without – may also have been responsible for focusing theoretical 
attention on policies that are internal to an economy, such as (1) banning child labor, (2) 
minimum-wage legislation and its enforcement, and (3) other labor-market reforms.5 In fact, 
Basu (1999, 2000 and 2002) has extensively investigated ways of shocking an economy 
away from a “bad” equilibrium with child labor to a “good” equilibrium without any child 
labor whatsoever, by means of labor market policy reforms or institutional reforms within 
an economy, even if driven by international labor standards that are external to that 
economy. Other issues that have received theoretical attention are: (i) an inverted U shape 
under alternative labor market arrangements of the relationship between the size of a 
family’s land holdings and its supply of child labor (see Bar and Basu (2008) and Basu et al. 
(2010)), and (ii) that credit constraints can combine with low wage rates to precipitate child 
labor in equilibrium (see Ranjan (1999, 2001) and Menon (2010)).6 
The focus of this paper is different, however. It returns the debate back, some twenty years 
later, to questions such as: what can be done by the government of a country to reduce the 
incidence of child labor in its own economy by making changes in its own foreign trade and 
foreign investment policies. Or, what can be done by someone outside this economy, by 
deploying policies towards commodity trade or policies dealing with international capital 
mobility, to mitigate the problem of child labor. A systematic, theoretical examination of the 
                                                          
3 See also Cigno et. al (2002) in this context. 
4 We do not consider the effects of foreign aid that takes the form of the country receiving a gift of real GDP, 
although that can also be investigated, but rather focus on foreign direct investment that works through the 
markets (via local business expansion) to spur additional demand for labor, and thereby raises the wage rate. 
5 Such multiple general equilibria carry over to our model as well. However, we relegate their treatment to the 
appendix, so as not to detract from the central message of our paper. 
6 Also see in this context, Basu and Zarghamee (2009), Baland and Robinson (2000), Beegle et al. (2006), 
Dumas (2013), Bell and Gersbach (2009), Bommier and Dubois (2004), among others.   
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effects on the incidence of child labor of foreign trade and investment policies, adopted by a 
country or by foreign countries, is the subject matter of this paper. 
While the number of child workers in excess of 150 million in 2016 is not statistically 
insignificant, and while a theoretical investigation of the relationship between foreign trade 
and investment policies and child labor is missing, a case still has to be made positively and 
affirmatively for such an examination of the relationship between the two to be undertaken. 
Two questions must be answered: (1) Why should we be interested in reducing child labor? 
And, (2) is there reason to believe that the considered use of foreign trade or investment 
policy can reduce child labor? We next take up these questions in turn. 
Why should we want to do away with child labor in the world? This is an issue of social 
evaluation, or normative economics. We argue below that child labor is an injustice on the 
definition of injustice in The Idea of Justice according to Sen (2009). We further argue that it 
is a remediable injustice. And, according to Sen (2009), the purpose of a theory of justice is 
to (i) identify remediable injustices, and (ii) to design remedies for such injustices, so as to 
achieve greater justice in society in a piecemeal manner.7 This goal of redressing a 
remediable injustice, in the limited sphere of mitigating child labor via foreign trade and 
investment policies, is the subject matter of the investigation reported here.  
According to Sen’s theory of justice, if the capabilities set of a person is constricted relative 
to the capabilities sets of others in society (without any role of that person in its shrinkage), 
then that person is suffering from an injustice.8 A person’s capabilities set is the set of 
alternative functionings vectors from which the person has the substantive freedom to 
choose. Which functionings vector the person eventually chooses is determined by the 
person, based on whatever he or she has reason to value, and the person achieves that state 
of functionings – being or doing – through his or her own agency. What are the components 
of a functionings vector of a person? There is no pre-specified list, and the context is material, 
but they include such attributes as having adequate nutrition, housing, personal safety, 
leisure, high life expectancy (as part of a group), freedom from morbidity, to such matters as 
to taking part in the life of the community, and to be able to appear in public without shame, 
essentially whatever the person has reason to value.9 
A significant matter to be taken into account in translating a person’s commodity holdings 
into that person’s capabilities to function is to pay explicit attention to the personal 
                                                          
7 Sen (2009) contrasts his theory of justice, which he calls a comparative theory of justice, with the pre-eminent 
theories of justice, which are contractarian in character, and which are transcendental in that they characterize 
a perfectly just state of society, though without providing any guidance on how to achieve greater justice if 
existing reality is riddled with injustices.   
8 This definition of injustice is subject to a qualification regarding demands of fairness that may require some 
interpersonal differences in respective capabilities sets to remain in place. For instance, women almost 
everywhere have a higher life expectancy than men, in practically every country, and it would be unjust to 
withhold some health care interventions from women to shrink their capability sets to bring them in line with 
those of men, as noted by Sen (2002).   
9 Sen (2009, Ch. 11- 14) contains a most lucid statement of the Capabilities Approach to social evaluation. 
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characteristics with regard to his or her ability, or lack thereof, to convert these commodities 
into capabilities to function.10 Based on this very rough caricature of Sen’s theory of justice, 
we argue, next, that a child being a worker is an injustice on the ground that his or her 
capabilities set is constricted relative to the capabilities sets of children who are not workers.   
Consider two otherwise identical children, except that one is a worker (CW) and the other is 
not, thus a non-laboring child (C). There are stark differences between the lives of the two 
children: C takes an afternoon nap, CW does not, C plays with other children, CW doesn’t, C 
goes to a kindergarten or elementary school, CW doesn’t, C exhibits levels of emotional and 
intellectual development common to the greatest many children in the world the same age, 
CW doesn’t. All this is in the present. But, C has a high likelihood of becoming an educated, 
skilled worker as an adult, CW is unlikely to have such an expansive capabilities set as an 
adult, thereby laying the ground for their respective unequal capabilities sets in future. The 
capabilities sets of child workers are unambiguously constricted, shrunken, compared to the 
capabilities sets of children who are not child workers at present, and such abridgement will 
be perpetuated in future also. Thus, by Sen’s theory of justice, child workers suffer from an 
injustice.11 There is a case, therefore, for redressing this injustice wherever it might occur.12 
Next, why employ foreign trade and investment policies to combat child labor? The primary 
driver, but by no means the only cause, of the supply of child labor by the adult of a family is, 
as Basu and Van argue, and as we also assume, the heart-wrenching predicament of the adult 
that his or her own income is insufficient to meet the subsistence needs of the family 
comprising of the adult and a child. If the income at the command of the adult is enough to 
meets the family’s subsistence needs, it is the adult’s preference that the child remain a non-
laboring child. It is thus the lowness of the family’s income, to a critical level below the 
family’s subsistence expenditure, that brings forth the supply of child labor by the adult of a 
family.13 Four interrelated observations are worth making in this context. 
                                                          
10 For example, a bicycle may serve as a mode of transport for an able-bodied person, but would not provide 
the same functioning to a person with certain types of disability, or the nutritional intake would be less from 
the same amount of food for a person afflicted with intestinal parasites. See Kuklys (2005) for the substantial 
upward revision of poverty rates in the U.K. when such handicap conversion factors are included to account for 
the additional income needs of families with persons with one form of serious disability or another. 
11 The social evaluation in summary form undertaken here is in the space of individual capability sets, which 
are essentially sets – one per person – of the substantive freedoms or opportunities from which a person 
eventually through his or her own agency chooses specific functioning outcomes, based on whatever he or she 
has reason to value. This is not an evaluation in the space of individual utilities or of individual incomes or 
wealth holdings, which typically tend to be scaler (or vector) outcomes. Also, while a non-binary preference 
relation of the adult in the family is deployed in the next section, this is done solely for the descriptive purpose 
of modeling behavior, but no attempt is made here to undertake a normative assessment by taking social 
welfare as a systematic function of individual preferences, as in Arrow (1963), for instance. For a probing 
investigation of alternative spaces in which social evaluation may be undertaken, and for a forceful case in favor 
of social evaluation in the space of individual capabilities, see Sen (1999). 
12 But, this is not the only injustice in the phenomenon of child labor. The injustice suffered by the parent whose 
child becomes a worker is also taken up in the concluding section.  
13 It is thus not greedy employers who are responsible for child labor. In fact, for a (i) profit-maximizing 
employer (ii) who faces competition from other firms, the source of labor – adult or child – cannot be of 
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First, the policy instruments we consider are effective in alleviating the incidence of child 
labor arising due to the lowness of family income, but they may not reduce that component 
of child labor which arises from other causes.14 Second, child labor is not the same thing as 
labor performed by a child whether for a market wage or for the family. A child helping lay 
the dining table or with washing dishes is certainly labor performed by a child, as is mowing 
the neighbor’s yard or babysitting done by a child, but that is not what we call child labor as 
the problem that we would wish to alleviate. Instead, child labor is, in our theory, labor 
performed by a child precisely to earn income that will supplement family income for the 
purpose of reaching the goal of meeting the family’s subsistence need that would otherwise 
go unmet.  
Third, boundary questions such as whether age 17 or 16 or any other should constitute the 
dividing line between an adult and a child is not crucially important to our argument. In 
2016, according to the ILO, over 72 million child workers were as young as 5 – 11 years old, 
and there is no ambiguity about whether an eleven-year-old is a child. That is at least 72 
million children too many, and we argue that it is actually possible to reduce that number 
with a considered choice of foreign trade and investment policies. 
Fourth, it is noteworthy that some, though not all, families have such critically low incomes, 
so that it is their children who become workers, not of richer families. Even among the 
families at risk of their children becoming workers, there is variation in family income – and 
this is a novel feature of our model, on which more presently. It is the children of poorer at-
risk families who become child workers, and not of the richer at-risk families. What we seek 
is a set of policies that will raise the economy-wide wage rate, and thereby increase family 
incomes, so that fewer children – coming from fewer families – will remain child workers.    
To conduct the investigation thus, we must depart from Basu and Van, and from all other 
theoretical investigations of the matter, in deliberately assuming non-identical families, in 
particular in terms of family income.15 While in Basu and Van’s investigation all families are 
identical, so that in equilibrium either no child works or all children work, we assume inter-
family differences in non-labor incomes; however, for a non-trivial decision problem for the 
families we assume these incomes to be sufficiently low so as not to cover the families’ entire 
subsistence expenditure needs, thereby requiring a positive wage rate for these families’ 
subsistence. While in their general model, Basu and Van do allow for the child’s labor supply 
to be chosen from the continuum [0, 1], all families in their general model are also identical. 
They go on to say, “our model is not critically dependent on the homogeneity of agents. 
However, to raise further questions of policy and impact on different kinds of households it 
                                                          
significance due to fear of suffering losses, but only the only the magnitude of this input employed matters to 
the employer in determining the output of the commodity to be sold.  
14 If some children become workers, for instance, due to parental illness, substance dependency, or indeed any 
reason other than low family income, then the remedies lie elsewhere.  
15 A ‘hybrid equilibrium’ in which some, though not all, children work is considered in by Swinnerton and 
Rogers (1999) and Basu and Van (1999) in the context of redistribution policies aimed at eliminating child 
labor.    
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will be natural to generalize along these lines in future” (p. 420). Here we pursue this 
suggestion and model families that differ in their magnitudes of non-labor income.   
For a great many families, certainly, the only source of income is labor income. If the wage 
rate is less than subsistence family consumption, the children of such families will become 
workers. However, given the same economy-wide wage rate, if some children do not work 
in the same country, it must be because these families have some non-labor income, say 
income from land or capital, which renders family income high enough to keep their children 
out of the labor force. But, in the middle somewhere are families that have some non-labor 
income, but this income does not cover their entire subsistence expenditure, so that a 
positive wage rate is necessary for their children not to become workers. As the wage rate 
rises, fewer children from fewer families remain child workers. Thus, our assumption of 
inter-family differences in non-labor income induces smoothness in the labor supply 
function, which helps highlight the role of increasing the demand for labor expressly to raise 
the wage rate in equilibrium, thereby pulling more families out of the critically-low-income 
predicament that gets them to enter their children into the labor force.   
In this range, changes in the wage rate, the rental rate of capital or the rent of land play a 
crucial role in determining whether or not a family’s income falls above or below its 
subsistence expenditure in equilibrium, and thus determines the rate of incidence of child 
labor in the economy. We also know from the trade policy literature that tariff protection 
affects real wages and factor prices in general. Thus there are theoretical grounds for 
expecting foreign trade and investment policy choice to affect the incidence of child labor. 
This establishes the remediable character of the injustice of child labor.     
Specifially, we find that under endogenous international capital mobility inward FDI reduces 
the incidence of child labor if stimulated by a country’s trade policy of granting protection to 
the sector that employs child labor. Child labor persists, however, if there is exogenous 
inward FDI and it is small in magnitude; it is eradicated in equilibrium if this FDI is 
sufficiently large. If the supply of capital in the country is fixed, granting greater tariff 
protection or higher export subsidy to a sector that employs child labor reduces its incidence, 
and may eventually eliminate it. Since a country’s aggregate real income decreases as the 
import tariff increases, it may sometimes face the moral dilemma of having to choose 
between higher real GDP or fewer child workers as an entailment of its foreign trade policy. 
Section 2 contains an outline of the child-labor hypothesis, based entirely on Basu and Van 
(1998), and Basu (1999, 200 and 2002), and deals with the derivation of the labor supply 
function with varying numbers of child workers at different wage rates. Section 3 builds this 
child-labor phenomenon into a specific factors model to investigate the effects of inward FDI 
– both endogenous and exogenous – into an economy. Section 4 contains a discussion of the 
effects of trade policy on the incidence of child labor when the supply of capital in the 
economy is fixed. Section 5 is the concluding section, and it also contains a discussion of some 
moral dilemmas that characterize the very foundations of the theory of foreign trade policy 
evaluation that are exposed by our investigation. Section 5 also contains some implications 
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of our investigation for a past (and possibly pending) case of trade dispute settlement in the 
World Trade Organization between the US and India. The Appendix deals with the issues of 
multiplicity of equilibria and their stability.  
2. Family’s Child Labor Supply Decision 
Basu and Van make a forceful argument that a family has an aversion to entering its children 
into the labor force as workers unless it has to, and only by force of the need of the family’s 
survival which can actually be met by its children’s labor does the family make its children 
work. Otherwise, the family’s strict preference is against permiting its children to work; they 
wish childhood upon their children, not ardous work, if they can help it. Despite such a 
preference of families, Basu and Van are able to prove the existence of child labor as a mass 
phenomenon in general equilibrium. This is all the more striking, theoretically, than showing 
the existence of this phenomenon in general equilibrium merely with preference neutrality 
of the decision-making parent towards child labor. 
In our formal model, following Basu and Van, we assume that each family is made up of one 
adult and one child. The adult in every family always supplies 1 unit of labor regardless of 
the wage rate or family income. If a family enters its child into the labor force, the child also 
supplies 1 unit of labor, so that the familiy’s labor supply is 2 units of labor.16 One decision 
the adult in the family must make is whether or not to enter the child into the labor force. 17  
In the absence of child labor, the income of family 𝑖 is 
 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑤 + 𝑛𝑖 ∀𝑖 = 1, … 𝑁,       (1) 
where 𝑁 is the number of families, 𝑤 > 0 is the wage rate and 𝑛𝑖 ≥ 0 is the family’s non-
labor income, both measured in the same commodity.18 Let 𝑠 > 0 be the exogenously fixed 
subsistence expenditure of each family, also measured in the same commodity. Of course, 
with child labor the family’s income is 𝑤 + 𝑦𝑖 =  2𝑤 + 𝑛𝑖 , and we assume throughout that 
this is at least equal to the family’s subsistence needs, 𝑠.19 
                                                          
16 Basu and Van assume that while the adult in the family always supplies 1 unit of labor, the child supplies a 
positive fraction 𝛾 units of labor per unit time. Since child labor is a substitute for adult labor in production, in 
general equilibrium the child wage rate will be  𝛾𝑤, where 𝑤 is the adult wage rate, so that (a) with child labor, 
the family’s income is 𝑤(1 +  𝛾 ) + 𝑛𝑖, and (b) with the number of families being 𝑁, the total supply of labor if 
all children work is 𝑁(1 + 𝛾). Nothing in our results changes qualitatively if we assume that 𝛾 = 1, and that is 
what we assume henceforth. Thus in our model, aggregate labor supply can be a minimum of 𝑁, or a maximum 
of 2𝑁, or somewhere in between.  
17 Bar and Basu (2008) also model a positive cost of adult supervision of child workers in their investigation of 
the relationship between giving additional land to potentially afflicted families and child labor, quite relevant 
for the question they are after, but not material to our context. 
18 Say in Kg. of corn per day or per year. 
19 If 2𝑤 + 𝑛𝑖 < 𝑠, it raises issues that we do not address here dealing with the threat to the survival of the family, 
malnutrition, hunger, or even sale of the child by the adult. We offer some preliminary observations on this 
important matter in the last section.   
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Following Basu and Van, we also take on board their Luxury Axiom, that child leisure is a 
luxury good, and the Substitutability Axiom, that child labor is a substitute for adult labor in 
production. In addition we make the following assumption.  
Low Non-labor Income Axiom: Assume that ∀𝑖: 𝑛𝑖 < 𝑠, so that every family needs a positive 
wage to subsist. 
One justificaton of this assumption is that if a family’s non-labor income is greater than 
subsistence expenditure, then it not only supplies no child labor, but it also does not supply 
any adult labor. 
The preference of the adult, who is the sole decision maker in each family, can be represented 
by a Kanger-Sen non-binary ranking relation20 of strict preference 𝑃𝑖(𝑉
𝑖) that is dependent 
on the family’s background set 𝑉𝑖, and is defined on the set of alternatives 
{(𝑐𝑖, 𝑙𝑖)| 𝑐𝑖 ≥ 0, 𝑙𝑖 ∈ {1, 2}}        (2) 
where 𝑐𝑖 is the family’s consumption and 𝑙𝑖 is its labor supply. The specific prefrerences of 
the adult, ∀𝛿 > 0, are 
(𝑐𝑖, 1) 𝑃𝑖(𝑉1
𝑖) (𝑐𝑖 + 𝛿, 2)  
and          (3) 
(𝑐𝑖 + 𝛿, 2) 𝑃𝑖(𝑉2
𝑖) (𝑐𝑖, 1)  
where 𝑉1
𝑖 stands for the condition 𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑠, or that the family’s income without child labor at 
least meets its subsistence needs, and 𝑉2
𝑖 stands for the condition 𝑦𝑖 < 𝑠, that the family’s 
income without child labor is insufficient to meets its subsistence needs.  
The adult in the family maximizes his or her preference 𝑃𝑖(𝑉
𝑖)  subject to the budget 
constraint 
𝑐𝑖 ≤ 𝑤𝑙𝑖 + 𝑛𝑖 .         (4) 
The solution to the family’s maximization problem is the demand function 
𝑐𝑖(𝑤, 𝑛𝑖) = {
𝑦𝑖,                                      ∀𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑠
𝑤 + 𝑦𝑖,                              ∀𝑦𝑖 < 𝑠 
     (5) 
and the labor supply function 
                                                          
20 See Sen (1997), where the adult acts in a fiduciary responsibility on behalf of the child in the family, and thus 
acts in accordance with the moral value of shielding the child from the rigors of labor, to the extent possible for 
the adult, upon which the adult’s binary preference relation is conditional. This conditionality confers non-
binariness on the ranking relation. While such a relation is incomplete, if it is reflexive and acyclical, a non-
empty maximal set still exists under this relation (Sen (1995)), and we exploit this property to derive the 
consumption demand and labor supply functions of a family as outcomes of its adult’s maximization as an act 
of his or her choice. 
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𝑙𝑖 = {
1,                                                     ∀𝑦𝑖 ≥ 𝑠
2,                                                    ∀𝑦𝑖 < 𝑠.  
     (6) 
Our formulation is the same as that of Basu and Van, except for 𝑛𝑖 = 0 in their model. This 
latter assumption of Basu and Van makes all families identical, so that if one supplies child 
labor, so do all. While in their model either all children in the economy work, or none do, we 
deliberately introduce inter-family differences in non-labor income so that in our model 
children of some families, though not necessarily of all, work in some equilibria. The 
consequence is the possibility of varying magnitudes of child labor in different equilibria – 
from more families or fewer – in addition to the polar cases of all or none. 
In particular, assume that 𝑛𝑖 = 𝑟𝑘𝑖 , where 𝑟 > 0 is the rental rate of capital, and 𝑘𝑖  is the 
amount of capital owned by family 𝑖, given exogenously. Assume also that the amount of 
capital owned by each family is indexed in strict monotonic increasing order: 𝑘𝑁 > 𝑘𝑁−1 >
⋯ > 𝑘2 > 𝑘1, with 𝑘1 = 0. Thus, without child labor the income of family 𝑖 is 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑘𝑖 , 
with 𝑦1 = 𝑤 as the income of the poorest family, and 𝑦𝑁 = 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑘𝑁 as the income of the 
richest family, with the low non-labor income assumption entailing ∀𝑖: 𝑟𝑘𝑖 < 𝑠. The wage 
rate and the rental rate are parameters for a family, and their values will be determined 
endogenously in general equilibrium (in the models of Sections 3 and 4), but for a given value 
of 𝑟 = 𝑟0, define 
?̂?𝑖(𝑟
0) = 𝑠 − 𝑟0𝑘𝑖         (7) 
as the reservation wage of family 𝑖, such that, from (1), (6) and the fact that 𝑛𝑖 = 𝑟𝑘𝑖, it 
follows that if 𝑤 ≥ ?̂?𝑖, the family only supplies adult labor, 𝑙𝑖 = 1, but if the wage rate falls 
below ?̂?𝑖, it supplies child labor also, 𝑙𝑖 = 2. Essentially, the amount of a family’s subsistence 
expenditure that is not covered by its non-labor income must be met by the adult’s labor 
income for the family to supply no child labor, failing which the family supplies child labor 
also. 
By construction (7), it follows that as 𝑛𝑖 = 𝑟
0𝑘𝑖 rises with 𝑖, ?̂?𝑖 falls, so that ?̂?1 > ?̂?2 > ⋯ >
?̂?𝑁 , with ?̂?1 = 𝑠 (since 𝑘1 = 0). In particular, if 𝑤 > ?̂?1, there is no child labor. But if ?̂?2 <
𝑤 < ?̂?1 then Family 1, only, enters its child as a worker, and if ?̂?3 < 𝑤 < ?̂?2, then the 
children of familes 1 and 2 become workers, and so on, until the wage rate falls to 𝑤 <
?̂?𝑁(𝑟
0) = 𝑠 − 𝑟0𝑘𝑁 , in which case all children become workers. Thus the labor supply 
function in this economy is 
𝐿𝑆 = {
𝑁,                                                                                       𝑤 ≥ 𝑠
𝑓(𝑤), 𝑓′(𝑤) < 0,                                     𝑠 >  𝑤 ≥ ?̂?𝑁(𝑟
0)
2𝑁,                                                                          𝑤 < ?̂?𝑁(𝑟
0).
  (8) 
Such a labor supply function for the economy is depicted as the curve 𝐿𝑆 in Figure 1. 
In Figure 1, if aggregate demand for labor is 𝐷4, the economy-wide wage rate 𝑤 > 𝑠 is 
sufficiently high that no family enters its child into the labor force, in equilibrium 𝐷. But if 
aggragate demand is  𝐷1, the wage rate is below the reservation wage ?̂?𝑁 of the richest 
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family, so that all children in equilibrium 𝐴 are workers. Under labor demand 𝐷2 and 𝐷3, 
respectively in equilibria 𝐵 and 𝐶, the children of poorer families work but the children of 
richer families do not. This is the empirical reality surrounding the policy choices. And 
policies that raise the wage rate in equilibrium will, piecemeal, reduce the incidence of child 
labor, with the children of richer families – among those whose children are working – 
getting released from child labor first. While there is child labor in both equilibria 𝐵 and 𝐶, 
there are fewer children working in 𝐶 because the equilibrium wage rate is higher than the 
reservation wage of more families than is the case with 𝐵. In fact, any policy that raises the 
equilibrium wage rate will reduce the incidence of child labor, provided, of course, the fall in 
non-labor income is not more than offsetting.  
[Insert Figure 1] 
This leads directly to a consideration of trade policy, (1) because we know from the Stolper-
Samuelson theorem, for instance, that if imports are labor intensive then an import tariff will 
raise the domestic relative price of the import competing good, and that in turn will raise the 
wage rate in general equilibrium, leading to a reduction in the number of child workers if 
non-labor income does not fall too sharply, and (2) any inflow of foreign capital into this 
economy will raise the marginal productivity of labor – under conditions that render labor 
and capital cooperative inputs – thereby increasing the aggragate demand for labor and the 
wage rate in equilibrium, to which will correspond fewer laboring children.  
Figure 1 brings out the crucial role played by the demand for labor in determining the 
incidence of child labor in the economy. Any policy that ends up raising the demand for labor 
will, by itself, reduce the number of laboring children, by raising the wage rate in equilibrium. 
The next section deals with sorting out such issues when there is inward FDI, and the 
subsequent section deals with trade policy, in general equilibrium. 
3. Foreign Direct Investment 
Consider a two-sector model of an economy that produces an agricultural commodity 𝐴 with 
a production function 
𝐴 = 𝐴(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿),         (9) 
where 𝐾𝑎 is the amount of capital demanded and 𝐿 is the amount of unskilled labor 
demanded. What has been refered to as labor in the previous section will henceforth be 
treated as synonymous with unskilled labor. 
This production function satisfis the following properties. All inputs are indespensible: 
𝐴(0, 𝐿) = 𝐴(𝐾𝑎, 0) = 0; constant returns to scale prevail: 𝐴(𝛼𝐾𝑎, 𝛼𝐿) = 𝛼𝐴(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿), 𝛼 > 0; all 
marginal products are positive: 𝐴𝐾 > 0, 𝐴𝐿 > 0; the production function is concave: 𝐴𝐾𝐾 ≤
0, 𝐴𝐿𝐿 ≤ 0, 𝐴𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐿𝐿 − 𝐴𝐾𝐿
2 ≥ 0; and the law of diminishing returns holds: 𝐴𝐾𝐾 < 0, 𝐴𝐿𝐿 < 0. 
From this it follows as an entailment that labor and capital are cooperative inputs, in the 
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sense that if more capital is employed then the marginal product of labor rises, and if more 
labor is employed than the marginal product of capital rises: 𝐴𝐿𝐾 > 0.21  
The manufacturing sector’s production function is 
𝑀 = 𝑀(𝐾𝑚, 𝐻),         (10) 
where 𝐾𝑚 is the amount of capital demanded and 𝐻 is the demand for skilled workers. This 
production function has the same properties as the agricultural production function. This is 
the production structure of the Specific Factors model, as in Jones (1971), where capital is 
intersectorally mobile but unskilled labor is specific to agriculture, and skilled labor is 
specific to manufacturing.   
All firms in both sectors are price takers in all markets. The demand for unskilled labor and 
capital in agriculture is determined by the conditions of equality of values of marginal 
products of the factors with their respective factor prices: 
 𝑝𝑎𝐴𝐿(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿) = 𝑤         (11) 
and 
𝑝𝑎𝐴𝐾(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿) = 𝑟         (12) 
where 𝑝𝑎 is the domestic price of the agricultural commodity, and 𝑤 is the unskilled wage 
rate.  
In the manufacturing sector, 𝑤𝐻, the skilled wage rate must equal the value of marginal 
product of skilled labor, so that  
𝑝𝑚𝑀𝐻(𝐾𝑚, 𝐻) = 𝑤𝐻.        (13) 
In (13), 𝑝𝑚 is the domestic price of the manufactured commodity, and factor demand in 
manufacturing must also satisfy 
𝑝𝑚𝑀𝐾(𝐾𝑚, 𝐻) = 𝑟.         (14) 
Throughout we treat this as a small, open economy that acts as a price taker on world 
commodity markets, with 𝑝𝑎
∗  and 𝑝𝑚
∗  as the world prices. The supply of skilled labor is also 
treated throughout as inelastically supplied at ?̅?. Additionally, while the quantity of capital 
owned by unskilled workers is Σ1
𝑁𝑘𝑖 < 𝑁𝑠/𝑟, this is by assumption less than the domestically 
owned part of the total capital employed in the country in the two sectors, 𝐾𝑎 + 𝐾𝑚, because 
of our assumption of low non-labor income of every one of the 𝑁 families. Who owns the 
additional capital in the country that is not owned by unskilled workers in not crucial to our 
argument, as long as neither these capital owners nor the skilled workers provide any supply 
of unskilled labor or of child workers from their families.  
                                                          
21 Note that constant returns to scale ensures that 𝐴𝐾𝐾𝐴𝐿𝐿 − 𝐴𝐾𝐿
2 = 0, so that 𝐴𝐾𝐿 = 𝐴𝐿𝐾 = √𝐴𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐾𝐾 > 0. 
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Consider first the case of endogenous international capital mobility, as in Neary (1985, 1988) 
and Chandra and Naqvi (1997), among others. Let 𝑟∗ be the world rental rate of capital. 
Under endogenous international capital mobility, if the domestic rental rate of capital is 
greater than the world rate, 𝑟 > 𝑟∗, foreign capital flows into this country, and the reverse 
flow occurs if 𝑟 < 𝑟∗, so that in equilibrium the values of marginal product of capital in both 
sectors equal 𝑟∗. That is, we have 
𝑝𝑎𝐴𝐾(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿) = 𝑟
∗        (12a) 
and 
𝑝𝑚𝑀𝐾(𝐾𝑚, 𝐻) = 𝑟
∗.         (14a) 
The graph of (12a) in Figure 2 shows how, for a given 𝑟∗, the employment of capital in 
agriculture, ?̃?𝑎, is detrmined in free trade equilibrium (when 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎
∗ ), for a given value of 
unskilled labor employment 𝐿. 
[Insert Figure 2] 
Further, Figure 3 contains (i) the graph of the unskilled labor supply function 𝐿𝑆 in (8), and 
(ii) the graph of the demand for unskilled labor implicit in the value of marginal product of 
such labor in (11). Figure 3 shows how, for given 𝑟∗ and 𝑝𝑎
∗ ,  the employment of labor, ?̃?, and 
the equilibrium unskilled wage rate, ?̃?, are determined in free trade equilibrium for a given 
value of capital employment in agriculture 𝐾𝑎.  
[Insert Figure 3] 
Essentially, (8), (11) and (12a) uniquely determine ?̃?, ?̃?, and ?̃?𝑎 in equilibrium, here in free 
trade, under the restrictions on the production functions. 
Suppose next this country introduces a policy of import tariff if the agricultural commodity 
is imported, or an export subsidy if it is exported. Then the domestic price of this commodity 
becomes 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎
∗ + 𝑡, where 𝑡 > 0 is the import tariff or the export subsidy. This will render 
the value of marginal product of capital in agriculture greater that 𝑟∗in (12a), and as is 
evident form Figure 2, to lower the marginal product of capital in agriculture to restore 
equilibrium, there will be an inflow of foreign capital into the agricultural sector, with   ?̃?𝑎
𝑡 >
?̃?𝑎. In Figure 3, both because the domestic price of the agricultural commodity is higher, and 
because more capital is now employed in agriculture (and labor and capital are cooperative 
inputs), the curve representing the value of marginal product of unskilled labor will shift to 
the right. In the new, trade-policy-induced equilibrium at 𝐶, the unskilled wage rate is higher, 
?̃?𝑡 > ?̃?, and the incidence of child labor is lower, ?̃?𝑡 − 𝑁, than at the free trade equilibrium 
?̃? − 𝑁 at 𝐵. This is because the constancy of the rental rate of capital under endogenous 
international capital mobility ensures that no family suffers a fall in non-labor income due to 
the introduction of trade policy, and a higher unskilled wage rate induced by such a policy 
ensures that fewer families now have family income below their subsistence expenditure. 
There is no ambiguity in this result. 
13 
 
Proposition 1: Under endogenous international capital mobility inward FDI reduces the 
incidence of child labor in the country if induced by a country’s own trade policy of protecting 
the sector that employs child labor.  
We turn next to an economy in which the supply of capital is exogenoulsy given, ?̅?, so that 
the rental rate of capital is also endogenously determined in general equilibrium, in addition 
to the unskilled and skilled wage rates. Equations (8) – (11), (13) and 
𝑝𝑎𝐴𝐾(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿) = 𝑝𝑚𝑀𝐾(𝐾𝑚, 𝐻)       (15) 
and  
𝐾𝑎 + 𝐾𝑚 = ?̅?          (16) 
now describe the equilibrium of the economy, with (15) and (16) now replacing (12a) and 
(14a). The unskilled labor market equilibrium is still depicted in Figure 3 – the graph of (8) 
and (11) – and the capital market equilibrium – the graph of (15) and (16) – in Figure 4.22 
[Insert Figure 4] 
Figure 4 shows how the equality of the mariginal produts of capital in agriculture and 
manufacturing determines both the allocation of capital ?̅? to the two sectors, ?̃?𝑎 and ?̃?𝑚, as 
well as the equilibrium rental rate of capital 𝑟0, for given values of 𝐿 and 𝐻. And for given 
values of 𝐾𝑎 and 𝐾𝑚, since the demand for skilled labor equals its inelastic supply of ?̅? in 
equilibrium, the demand for unskilled labor and the unskilled wage rate are determined as 
?̃? and ?̃? in Figure 3, with the understanding that ?̂?𝑁(𝑟
∗) = ?̂?𝑁(𝑟
0).  
Suppose now there is an exogenous FDI inflow into this country in the amount 𝐾𝑓. The 
horizontal axis in Figure 4 gets stretched from 𝑂𝑎𝑂𝑚 to 𝑂𝑎𝑂𝑚
′ , by this magnitude. The dashed 
line in Figure 4 is the same curve as the bold line representing the value of marginal product 
of capital in manufacturing, except that it has been redrawn relative to the new origin 𝑂𝑚
′  
that reflects larger supply of capital in the economy in the amount ?̅? + 𝐾𝑓. Post exogenous 
FDI, the rental rate of capital in equilibrium is lower, 𝑟1 < 𝑟0, and more capital is now 
employed in both sectors. Since inputs are cooperative, this raises the marginal productivity 
of skilled labor in manufacturing, and the marginal product of unskilled labor in agriculture, 
and thus raises both wage rates. 
While a rise in the unskilled wage rate increases family income of every family, a fall in the 
rental rate of capital reduces non-labor income of all families that own capital – all but Family 
1, the poorest, which owns no capital. The effect of these factor price changes on family 
income is thus ambigous for all but the poorest family. In particular, 𝑟1 < 𝑟0 implies that 
from (7), ∀𝑖 = 2, … 𝑁: ?̂?𝑖(𝑟
1) = 𝑠 − 𝑟1𝑘𝑖 > ?̂?𝑖(𝑟
0) = 𝑠 − 𝑟0𝑘𝑖, reflecting a greater deficit of 
non-labor income necessary to meet each of these families’ susbsistence needs. This upward 
                                                          
22 Of course, there is no commodity market equilibrium issue here, because of the assumption that this is a 
small, open economy, which can buy or sell any amount of each commodity at exogenously given world prices. 
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shift in the reservation-wage schedule of the families necessitates redrawing Figure 3, the 
labor market equilibrium diagram, as Figure 5. 
[Insert Figure 5] 
  In Figure 5, the richest family, Family N, suffers the greatest decline in non-labor income, 
?̂?𝑁(𝑟
1) − ?̂?𝑁(𝑟
0) = (𝑟0 − 𝑟1)𝑘𝑁, due to a fall in the rental rate of capital, because it owns 
owns the greatest amount of capital. This is the greatest increase in reservation wage 
experienced by any family, and every other family suffers an everdecreasing hike in 
reservation wage, with the marginal family, Family 1, suffering do decrease at all. Thus, 
pivoted at 𝑤 = 𝑠, the reservation wage schedule rotates counter-clockwise, so that the 
relevant reservation wage schedule at 𝑟 = 𝑟1 is the dashed line. If the pre-FDI equilibrium is 
at 𝐴, the new, post-FDI equilibrium in the unskilled labor market will be at 𝐵’, rather than at 
𝐵. The new equilibrim in the unskilled labor market 𝐵’ can be to the left or the right of the 
vertical through the previous equilibrium at 𝐴, implying that post-FDI there may be less or 
more laboring childen in the economy. 
This ambiguity as the consequence of exogenous inward FDI points to the persistence of 
child labor in general equilibrium. But, this is the case if the inflow is small, and has the 
consequence of a small wage increase. If the inflow of FDI is substantial enough, however, to 
drive the wage rate up above the subsistence expenditure, as in equilibrium 𝐶 in Figure 5, 
then the concommitant fall in the rental rate and thus a family’s non-labor income ceases to 
matter, because all child labor has been wiped out by such a substantial dose of inward FDI. 
Much care must be exercised in dealing with a policy that encourages exogenous inward FDI. 
Such magnitutes of FDI which raise labor income marginally, but which also reduce non-
labor income – even though it is small for such families (𝑛𝑖 = 𝑟𝑘𝑖 < 𝑠) – has an ambigous 
effect on total family income without child labor (𝑦𝑖 = 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑘𝑖), and thus may fail to reduce 
the incidence of child labor in the economy. It is also clear from Figure 5, however, that if a 
sufficiently large amount of FDI reaches the agricultural sector, then the value of marginal 
product of unskilled labor will increase enough to raise the wage rate above the family-
subsitence bar (𝑤 > 𝑠) , as at equilibrium C. This conclusion is summarised as the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2: Child labor persists if inward foreign direct investment is exogenous and is 
small in magnitude, but is eradicated in equilibrium if this FDI is sufficiently large.  
Proposition 2 deals with what can be done from outside a country – possibly by a foreign 
country – to eradicate child labor, not by giving foreign aid, but by giving incentives to foreign 
entrepreneurs to relocate their capital in the country afflicted with child labor, for the 
purpose of business expansion there that will work through the labor market to raise the 
wage rate sufficiently. This actually occurred starting 2001 when the US, after suffering 
terrorist attacks on September 11,  quite suddenly normalized foreign trade and investment 
relations with India – which had earlier been strained because India had refused to sign the 
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Nuclear Non-prolifiration Treaty – and consequently India experienced unprecedented rates 
of GDP growth, labor demand, and wage increases.           
4. Tariffs and the Incidence of Child labor 
Suppose now that the supply of capital in the economy is fixed at ?̅? (there is no inflow of 
capital, exogenous or endogenous), and the only instruments of policy available to a 
government are import tariffs or export subsidies. Again, (8) – (11), (13), (15) and (16) 
characterize the Walrasian equilibrium of this economy.  
When (15) changes from 𝑝𝑎
∗ 𝐴𝐾(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿) = 𝑝𝑚𝑀𝐾(𝐾𝑚, 𝐻) under free trade to 
(𝑝𝑎
∗ + 𝑡)𝐴𝐾(𝐾𝑎, 𝐿) = 𝑝𝑚𝑀𝐾(𝐾𝑚, ?̅?), 𝑡 > 0      (15a) 
under an import tariff on (or an export subsidy to) the agricultural commodity, at initial 
values of  𝐾𝑎, 𝐿 and 𝐾𝑚, the LHS of (15a) becomes higher than the RHS. To lower the value of 
marginal product of capital in agriculture, 𝐾𝑎 must increase, and correspondingly 𝐾𝑚 must 
fall, which raises the value of marginal product of capital in manufacturing, and thus 
increases the rental rate of capital, from 𝑟0 to 𝑟1 in Figure 6. Post-tariff, the employment of 
capital in agriculture ?̿?𝑎 is higher than in free trade. 
[Insert Figure 6] 
The increase in the rental rate of capital rotates the reservation schedule of the families 
clockwise, as shown in Figure 7. Also, both the increase in capital employment in agriculture, 
and the increase in the domestic price of the agricultural commodity together shift out the 
value of marginal product of labor, resulting in the equilibrium shifting from 𝐵 to 𝐶 in Figure 
7. In the post-tariff equilibrium the equilibrium wage rate is higher, ?̿? > ?̃?, the rental rate is 
higher, 𝑟1 > 𝑟0, and as a concequence, every family’s income 𝑦𝑖 = 𝑤 + 𝑟𝑘𝑖  is higher. 
Naturally, there are fewer child workers ?̿? − 𝑁 < ?̃? − 𝑁 in the economy in the post-tariff 
equilibrium.  
[Insert Figure 7] 
In fact, if the tariff is raised further – which can be done up to the prohibitive tariff rate – 
more capital will shift from manufacturing to agriculture, which will both raise the 
equilibrium wage rate and the rental rate of capital, and this will cause a monotonic decline 
in the incidence of child labor, quite possibly eliminating it eventually. It is possible, however, 
that there are still child workers in equilibrium even when the tariff has been raised to its 
prohibitive level and thus cannot be raised any further. In such a case, the number of child 
workers will be fewer in autarky than at any tariff below the prohibitive rate, but not zero. 
These conclusions are summarized in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3: Granting greater tariff protection or higher export subsidy to a sector that 
employs child labor monotonically reduces the incidence of child labor, and may eventually 
eliminate it.  
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This policy prescription is somewhat strong. And it is obtained under standard assumptions 
about technology in economic theory, and on Basu and Van’s Luxury Axiom and 
Substitutability Axiom and on our assumption of lowness of non-labor income of families 
whose children are at risk of becoming child workers. Of course, we have assumed 
maximizing behavior on the part of both producers and families. Each family, though, 
mximizes a Kanger-Sen non-binary ranking relation of strict preference, and we know that 
this relation generates a non-empty maximal set over a partially ordered domain, which we 
have assumed.23  
In light of the simple remedy for child labor highlighted by Proposition 3, it is fair to ask why 
such a readily available solution has not been adopted, and such large numbers of children – 
over 150 million in 2016 – continue to labor, many in hazardous conditions.  
The answer may lie in a standard result in the theory of international trade policy. This is 
restated here. 
Tariff and Real Income: The aggregate real income of a country is maximum in free trade, and 
ceteris paribus, it monotonically decreases as the import tariff on an imported commodity 
increases, reaching a minimum at the prohibitive tariff (that entails autarky).24 
This relationship between a tariff and real income of a country and the result contained in 
Propositions 3 are brought together in Figure 8. In the right panel, in free trade (𝑡 = 0), the 
country’s real income is at a maximum, but as the import tariff rises, its real income falls 
                                                          
23 The sharpness of the result contained in Proposition 3 is the consequence of the Specific Factors production 
structure deployed here, with unskilled labor specific to agriculture only, and skilled labor specific to 
manufacturing only. However, if the Heckscher-Ohlin model is deployed for an examination of an import tariff 
on the agricultural commodity, some ambiguity in the conclusion will result for small tariff increases, as in 
Proposition 2, because the Stolper-Samuelson theorem will hold. To see this, note that in the altered model, 
there is no skilled labor, and unskilled labor is employed in both sectors: 𝐴 = 𝐴(𝐾𝑎 , 𝐿𝑎), 𝑀 = 𝑀(𝐾𝑚 , 𝐿𝑚), 𝐾𝑎 +
𝐾𝑚 = 𝐾, and 𝐿𝑎 + 𝐿𝑚 = 𝐿
𝑆. This model satisfies what Neary (1985) calls the property of local factor price 
equalization, so that factor prices (𝑤, 𝑟) are determined in equilibrium independently of factor supply levels. 
If agriculture is labor intensive, as it tends to be in poor countries that suffer from child labor, then an import-
tariff-induced increase in the price of the agricultural commodity will cause the wage rate to rise, and the rental 
rate of capital to fall. This will result in all but the poorest families suffering a fall in non-labor income, so that 
the reservation wage schedule will rotate counter-clockwise, as in Figure 5. As a result, we will find, as in 
Proposition 2, that persistence of child labor is the result of marginal increases in tariff protection of the labor 
intensive sector, but the incidence of child labor will fall if tariff increases are sufficiently large. 
24 Let 𝐶𝑎 and 𝐶𝑚 be the aggregate quantities of the agricultural and manufactured commodities consumed in 
the country. Total expenditure on consumption is 𝐸 = 𝑝𝑎𝐶𝑎 + 𝑝𝑚𝐶𝑚, where 𝑝𝑎  and 𝑝𝑚 are the domestic prices  
of the two commodities. Assume that 𝑝𝑚 = 𝑝𝑚
∗ , the world price, and 𝑝𝑎 = 𝑝𝑎
∗ + 𝑡, where 𝑡 ≥ 0 is the import tariff 
on the imported agricultural commodity. Aggregate consumption is financed by aggregate income, which is  
𝑝𝑎𝐴 + 𝑝𝑚𝑀 + 𝑡(𝐶𝑎 − 𝐴), where the last term is tariff revenue. And, 𝐸 = 𝑌, so that 
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
=
𝑑𝑌
𝑑𝑡
. Since in equilibrium 
the marginal rate of transformation is equal to the price ratio, 
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑀
= −
𝑝𝑚
𝑝𝑎
, it follows that at given commodity 
prices, 
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
= 𝑡 (
𝐶𝑎
𝑑𝑡
−
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑡
). Since 
𝐶𝑎
𝑑𝑡
< 0 (because of downward sloping demand curve) and 
𝑑𝐴
𝑑𝑡
> 0 (because of 
upward sloping general equilibrium supply curve), it follows that 
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
= 0 if 𝑡 = 0, and 
𝑑𝐸
𝑑𝑡
< 0 if 0 < 𝑡 <  𝑡𝑝, 
where 𝑡𝑝 is the prohibitive tariff at which imports are zero, or 𝐶𝑎 = 𝐴. 
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monotonically until the tariff becomes prohibitive, 𝑡 = 𝑡𝑝, where imports are zero (or 𝐶𝑎 =
𝐴), and autarky is reached. However, as the tariff rises, the number of child workers declines 
monotonically, as given by the curves ?̂?(𝑡) or ?̃?(𝑡) in the left panel in Figure 8. 
[Insert Figure 8] 
If ?̂?(𝑡) represents the response of the number of child workers to tariff changes in Figure 8, 
then before the import tariff reaches the prohibitive rate, the incidence of child labor in the 
economy will be zero at 𝑡 = 𝑡∗, which may be called the optimal tariff that eradicates child 
labor. However, it is possible that the economy suffers from a chronic child labor problem, 
and even a prohibitive tariff fails to eradicate child labor if ?̃?(𝑡) represents the response of 
the number of child workers to tariff changes. The best that a tariff can accomplish in such a 
circumstance is to lower the incidence of child labor to 𝐶𝐴𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑦, in Figure 8. If such is the 
predicament, the only external-policy recourse left is to rely on large doses of foreign direct 
investment, as highlighted in Proposition 2. 
What Figure 8 brings out is a direct conflict between a country achieving the goals of (a) real 
income maximization and (b) reducing the incidence of child labor. This conclusion is 
inescapable. 
Proposition 4: Starting from free trade, if a country increases the rate of import tariff or 
export subsidy to a sector that employs child labor, the incidence of child labor declines and 
so does the real income of the country, up to the prohibitive rate or the eradication of child 
labor, whichever comes first.  
When the interest of the parents of child workers and the child workers themselves are in 
direct conflict with the interest of the country that wishes to maximize its aggregate real 
income, there clearly arises a moral dilemma. Economic theory provides no solution to such 
a dilemma. The solution lies, if one exists at all, in moral and political philosophy. And in 
political philosophy, the only theory of justice that provides guidance in the form of practical 
reason is Sen’s (2009) theory of justice, which aims to remove remediable injustices in 
piecemeal fashion. And, as we have argued, child labor is an injustice, which, as our paper 
shows, is a remediable injustice. What Proposition 4 highlights is the fact that mitigating this 
injustice is not invariable costless; some sacrifice of aggregate real income of a country may 
be required to remove this injustice. Thus our investigation reveals that a lack of willingness 
to make such sacrifice by intervening in free trade by deploying instruments of trade policy 
could also account for the persistence of child labor. 
A country may have the willingness to sacrifice some real national income to mitigate the 
prevalence of child labor from which it suffers, but sometimes it may encounter outside 
pressures that seek to prevent it from doing so. India, for instance, has been protecting parts 
of its agricultural sector, which is a policy in line with the recommendations that emerge 
from our investigation if child labor is a concern in this sector. However, on this the US 
recently brought action against India at the World Trade Organization (WTO). Since an 
appreciation of the conflict between these two goals is missing in the literature on child labor 
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and foreign trade and investment policy, cases of trade disputes before the court in the WTO 
– such as the dispute between the USA and India on the Indian ban on imports of poultry 
from the USA – may not have received in the past the kind of reasoned articulation India 
could have mounted on grounds of protection of this industry from foreign competition for 
the explicit purpose of keeping the incidence of child labor from rising in the country. 
Instead, India argued – entirely falsely – that American poultry was potentially infected with 
the bird flu virus, and recently lost the case in the WTO.25 This case, and possibly others like 
it, can actually be appealed legitimately on grounds of protecting the children of the country 
from the injustice of becoming laborers, if a case to that effect can empirically be made. 
5. Concluding Remarks  
Not only is child labor an injustice suffered by the children who are workers but it is also an 
injustice suffered by the parents of child workers. The capabilities of such parents to achieve 
a specific functioning – to prevent their children from becoming workers – is severely 
compromised when contrasted with the capabilities of a great many other parents. This 
indictment of child labor is non-welfarist insofar as the assessment is made in the space of 
individual freedom sets, not in the space of individual preference relations or welfare 
functions. In fact, every free-trade equilibrium in every version of the model we have 
examined here is Pareto efficient whether or not it involves laboring children, because these 
are undistorted, perfectly competitive economies under consideration. Such social states 
characterized by child labor are, therefore, more unjust than states without any laboring 
children on Sen’s definition of justice, though they are efficient on the weak Pareto criterion. 
To appreciate the contrast, note that the weak Pareto rule declares a social state 𝑥 socially 
superior to social state 𝑦 if and only if everyone in society, without exception, strictly prefers 
𝑥 over 𝑦. And, a state is Pareto efficient if and only if there exists no other attainable state 
that is Pareto superior to it. The Pareto rule evaluates social states in the space of personal 
binary preference relations or their utility (personal-welfare) function representations, 
whereas Sen’s evaluation of injustice is conducted in the space of individuals’ sets of 
substantive freedoms. Such divergent social evaluation outcomes of the same object of 
observation entails, as the next logical step, of having to choose between the two moral 
principles themselves: do we want a Pareto efficient outcome even though it is fraught with 
injustice, or do we want more justice for the laboring children and their parents? 
While there are many reasons why child labor arises as a mass phenomenon, we have 
focused exclusively on the lowness of family income as the primary cause, both because it is 
empirically true that a large component of child labor is due to this, and because it can be 
remedied by the right choice of economic policies. We have shown that a country can adopt 
specific trade policies unilaterally to at least mitigate the incidence of child labor, if not 
eradicate it altogether. We have also shown that other countries can send productive capital 
to a country afflicted with child labor, and that too will work through the markets to raise 
                                                          
25 See WTO (2019), DS430, for Dispute Settlement, and see related continuation of Dispute Settlement DS431, 
between India and the USA, expected by June 2019.  
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the productivity of the workers whose children are workers, raise their wage rates, and thus 
enable such parents to withdraw their children from the labor force.      
Much work still remains to be done on identifying effective remedies for the phenomenon of 
child labor, wherever in the world it still persists. Basu and Van have provided firm economic 
theoretic foundations for an understanding of this affliction. Policy analysis – both 
theoretical, as reported here, and empirical – for mitigating and eventually eradicating the 
injustice of child labor from the world has unfortunately tended to lag behind. This paper is 
an attempt at advancing such policy analysis further. But one issue that we have not 
considered formally (see Fn. 19), and one that deserves close attention, is what happens 
when the income of the family even after including the child’s income is still not enough to 
meet the family’s subsistence needs. In such a case the possibility arises that due to the 
family’s survival need, it may choose to sell its child, resulting in a ready supply of children 
into human trafficking. The demand for children in human trafficking can be dealt with as a 
law enforcement matter but the supply problem demands a more intricate solution, as we 
have outlined above. Our preliminary conclusion is that the policies that we have identified 
for dealing with child labor may still mitigate the problem of trafficking in children from the 
supply side, but if it persists in chronic form then only huge doses of private foreign capital 
infusion will help raise the domestic demand for labor – via domestic business expansion – 
and hence raise the wage rate sufficiently to dry up the supply of children for sale. More 
careful work is needed here.  
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Appendix 
In our examination we have deliberately stayed away from the issue of multiple equilibria, 
which occupies a more prominent place in the results reported by Basu and Van, and 
especially Basu (2002). Such multiplicity can arise in our model as well, and we take that up 
here. Figure 9 depicts five possible equilibria, 𝐴1 − 𝐴5, if, along with the economy’s labor 
supply curve as in Figure 1, the demand for labor is given by a non-linear, downward-sloping 
curve such as 𝐷1. But some of these equilibria are outright unstable, or quasi-stable. Trade 
theory dealing with domestic distortions was replete well into the 1970s with numerous 
paradoxes or perverse results, almost all of which Neary (1978) showed to be predicated on 
unstable equilibria, and were thus deemed to be of limited practical interest. This is because 
stable equilibria persist despite some turbulence and thus are likely to be observed, but the 
slightest of shocks moves the economy away from an unstable equilibrium, so that the latter 
is unlikely to persist long enough to be observed. Unstable equilibria certainly ought not to 
be subjected to comparative statics analysis, which is the main task we undertake in our 
examination.   
[Insert Figure 9] 
Taking Neary’s (1978) lead, consider the plausible dynamic adjustment mechanism 
?̇? = 𝛼(𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿𝑆)  (A1) 
where ?̇? is the time-rate-of-change of the unskilled wage rate, 𝛼 > 0 is the speed of 
adjustment of the wage rate, and 𝐿𝐷 and 𝐿𝑆 are the quantities of labor demanded and labor 
supplied respectively. 
According to the adjustment process (A1), equilibria 𝐴1 and 𝐴4 are unstable, insofar as at 
wage rates in their neighborhood above them there is excess demand for labor which will 
result in further wage  increases above these equilibria, and at wage rates below them there 
is excess supply of labor that will cause further wage declines. Equilibrium 𝐴2is quasi-stable 
in that it is stable above, but unstable below the wage rate at 𝐴2. Equilibria 𝐴3 and 𝐴5 are 
clearly stable under (A1). 
If the primary object of the exercise were description or characterization, which was the case 
with the work of Basu and Van (1998) and Basu (2002), then an investigation of multiple 
equilibria would be of considerable theoretical interest. However, our interest here is in 
deploying one policy shock or another to move the economy from a less desirable 
equilibrium such as 𝐴3 under labor demand 𝐷
1, to a more desirable one such as 𝐵 after the 
demand for labor curve has shifted to 𝐷2. Since in the practical approach taken here our 
primary interest is in increasing the demand for labor so that the equilibrium wage rate rises 
and fewer children, from fewer families, remain in the labor force, the multiplicity of 
equilibria under unchanged demand 𝐷1 remains an issue of more theoretical interest than 
of practical concern.  
